Exclusion of Black Americans from Juries in Certain Alabama Counties

Dennis Hall, et al. v. Douglas Albert Valeska, et al., 11-cv-894 (M.D. Ala. 2011),

On October 19, 2011, Drinker Biddle & Reath in collaboration with the Equal Justice Initiative of Montgomery, Alabama (EJI), under the auspices of the Barbara McDowell Foundation filed suit seeking to eradicate the long-standing pattern and practice of Alabama state prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified African Americans from serving on juries in serious felony cases (principally capital cases) in Houston and Henry Counties, Alabama, solely because of their race in violation of the U.S. Constitution, federal and anti-discrimination laws, including the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, and state law

The Complaint alleges that Defendants’ illegal pattern and practice has been in force for decades and continues to the present day and is evidenced by statistical data and acknowledged by rulings of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. From 2006 to 2010, for example, state prosecutors in Dothan, Alabama used peremptory strikes to exclude 82% of qualified black jurors in death-penalty cases. Through their request for declaratory and injunctive relief, Plaintiffs – five African American residents of Houston and Henry Counties who were themselves victims of Defendants’ discriminatory conduct – seek to put an end to Defendants’ unlawful discriminatory conduct and prevent any further harm to them, other qualified African American citizens who reside in Houston and Henry countries, and the community at large. Plaintiffs seek, among other injunctive relief, ongoing federal court monitoring of jury selection in Houston and Henry Counties.

In a decision filed March 28, 2012, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the Equal Protection clause afforded no injunctive relief to Plaintiff jurors and that 18 U.S.C. Section 243 provides no private right of action. Applying a broad construction of the principles articulated in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 679 (11th Cir. 1992), the district court reasoned that: (1) the relief requested by Plaintiffs would permit any member of a class subject to a peremptory strike to enforce an injunction which would necessarily interrupt a State criminal proceeding; (2) the enforcement of the injunction would require federal intervention and would be extremely intrusive on the state courts and the administration of state law; and (3) the collection of information concerning peremptory strikes and monitoring of State court proceedings would violate principles of comity.

Plaintiffs appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. Appellant argued that failure to grant injunctive relief would wholly deprive jurors subjected to discriminatory preemptive strikes (as distinct from a criminal defendant who may have divergent interests) of a remedy for Equal Protection violations and that the relief requested was distinguishable from O’Shea and Luckey because Appellants contemplated neither continuous federal oversight of State court proceedings nor utilization of the data collected as a predicate for a federal court order to enjoin a state proceeding. In an unpublished decision filed December 31, 2012, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing the intrusiveness of the requested relief. The 11th Circuit denied rehearing rehearing  and rehearing en banc.