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(Cite as: 977 A.2d 928)

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District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
CHIMES DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, INC., Petitioner,
v.
Patricia O. KING, Respondent.
No. 06-AA-1003.

July 30, 2009.

BEFORE: WASHINGTON^{*}, Chief Judge; RUIZ^{*}, REID, GLICKMAN, KRAMER, FISHER^{*}, BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, THOMPSON, and OBERLY, Associate Judges; KING^{*}, Senior Judge.

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

On consideration of respondent's petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc, and petitioner's consent motion for leave to file the lodged response, it is

ORDERED that the motion is granted and the Clerk is directed to file the lodged response to the petition. It is

FURTHER ORDERED by the merits division^{*} that the petition for rehearing is denied; and it appearing that the majority of the judges of this court has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc is denied.

Senior Judge KING would grant the petition for rehearing.

Associate Judges RUIZ, KRAMER, and OBERLY would grant rehearing en banc.

OBERLY, Associate Judge, dissenting, with whom RUIZ and KRAMER, Associate Judges, join:

I write separately to explain why I dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.

Patricia King, a hearing-impaired janitorial worker, voluntarily quit her job in the eighth month of a high-risk pregnancy that had already caused her to exhaust her entire 16 weeks of statutory Family Medical Leave, pursuant to a medically-approved absence, by the sixth month of her pregnancy. The Office of Administrative Hearings affirmed a claims examiner's award to King of unemployment benefits pursuant to [D.C.Code. § 51-110\(a\)](#) (2006), finding that she left her job "for good cause connected with the work." *Id.* A majority of a panel of this court reversed the award of benefits, holding that King's employer could not have known that her decision to quit her job in the eighth month had anything to do with complications of her pregnancy because King did not provide her employer with a *second* medical statement from her doctor sufficient to give the employer notice that her work gave her cause for resigning her job. The court has strayed too far from the requirement that the statute be "construed broadly to accomplish the legislative and statutory intent of minimizing the economic burden of unemployment." *Chimes District of Columbia, Inc. v. King*, 966 A.2d 865, 871 (D.C.2009) (King, Senior Judge, dissenting) (citing *Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Labor*, 409 A.2d 164, 171 (D.C.1979)).

Our court has previously recognized, in *Bublis v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services*, 575 A.2d 301 (D.C.1990), that a worker who quits her job voluntarily because of illness or disability caused or aggravated by her work does not lose her entitlement to unemployment benefits simply because the "medical statement"*⁹²⁹ she provides her employer does not meet requirements of code pleading. Rather, it is sufficient if the employer is provided enough information "to require it to assume the duty of inquiring further" into the circumstances of the employee's condition. *Id.* at 304. As we said in *Bublis*, the requirement for "medical

documentation” is a “potential snare for the unwary employee, and for that reason basic fairness dictates that *at some point* the party assumed to have greater knowledge of the regulatory scheme must bear the responsibility of confirming the nature and cause of the illness.” *Id.* (emphasis in original). The ALJ did no more than hold that that point had been reached in this case.

This is not simply a fact-bound question on which reasonable persons could disagree, and hence unworthy of en banc review. Rather, the conflict between the result reached by the panel majority in this case and the burden-shifting rule established in *Bublis* casts a cloud of uncertainty over the proper resolution of unemployment compensation claims that will befuddle employers and employees alike, not to mention the cadre of Claims Examiners and ALJs who must apply our court's decisions to the many cases they must decide each year, often under time pressures dictated by the exigent circumstances confronting those who find themselves facing the harsh reality of unemployment. On the facts of this case, the panel's plenary review contravenes the long-established rule that our court reviews the administrative decision below applying the highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard. 966 A.2d at 868.

There were ample facts in this case to permit the ALJ reasonably to conclude that the employee presented sufficient evidence to trigger *Bublis*' burden-shifting rule. Prior to the termination of her employment, King was a custodian whose job required prolonged standing, walking, bending, lifting and stooping. Several weeks into her pregnancy, King developed complications and was classified as a “high-risk” patient. Based on her obstetrician's advice, King provided the necessary medical documentation to her supervisor to support her request for medical leave. Her employer evaluated her request under its Family Medical Leave policy; that policy not only provided the statutorily required 16 weeks of unpaid leave but also authorized additional discretionary leave of up to 12 additional

weeks in the event of an employee's own serious health condition. Thus, King was eligible for a medical leave of up to 28 weeks.

Upon receiving King's request for medical leave, including the information submitted by her obstetrician, her employer determined that she was entitled to medical leave because of her own “serious health condition” and advised her that she had been approved for a 16-week medical leave. Before the expiration of her 16-week leave, King's obstetrician sent the employer a letter detailing accommodations to be made to King's work duties upon her return:

Patricia King is under my obstetrical care. Some modifications of her duties should be made to improve her obstetrical outcome. Please limit her duties to lifting no more than 10 pounds. She should also refrain from climbing more than two flights of stairs, pulling and pushing any heavy objects.

Upon receipt of this letter, King's supervisor advised King that she might be unable to return to work consistent with her physician's medical restrictions and told her to await her doctor's release for her return to regular work duties on or before the end of her scheduled leave expiration date. Shortly thereafter, King submitted a “return to work” certification completed by her physician that stated: “Ms. King can lift up to 30 pounds on occasion. She *930 can occasionally climb more than 2 flights of stairs. She will be unable to work entirely for 6-8 weeks following delivery.”

King then returned to work for approximately two months under the restrictions imposed by her physician, which were acceptable to her employer. During her eighth month of pregnancy (approximately six weeks before she delivered her baby), she advised her supervisor that she needed to take a second medical leave because of pregnancy-related complications, including back problems and dizziness.^{FN1} King believed that her supervisor assured her that taking a second medical leave would not be

a problem and that her job would be held for her. The supervisor denied making any such representations. Again (*see* n. 1, *supra*), the issue is not who said what but, rather, as the ALJ recognized, whether enough was said to put the employer on notice that it needed to make further inquiry.

FN1. Although there is a dispute in the record as to whether King said she “needed” to take a second medical leave or whether she said she “wanted” to stop working for the remainder of her pregnancy, the discrepancy does not change the issue in this case. Rather, it merely highlights the fact that, under *Bublis*, King gave her employer sufficient notice of her circumstances, supported by medical documentation, to place the burden on the employer of making further inquiry.

Regardless, King began what she thought was a second medical leave only to receive a termination letter from her employer three days later. The letter advised that she had used all of the Family Medical Leave to which she was entitled and made no mention of the company's discretionary policy of granting up to 12 weeks of additional leave in cases of “serious health conditions.”

At the hearing on King's claim for unemployment benefits, her employer never contended that it lacked sufficient medical information to determine whether she quit because the complications of her pregnancy gave her good cause connected with her work. Rather, the employer's representative said King was terminated because she had exhausted the 16 weeks of statutory leave to which she was entitled and that her position therefore had to be “closed.” In the absence of even the slightest indication that the employer needed more medical information to determine how to address King's request for a second medical leave, there should be no requirement that King had to “provide a new statement from her doctor to establish that her reasons for leaving were connected with her work as required by the regulations.” 966 A.2d at 870. In the

context of a complicated, high-risk pregnancy in which the claimant's obstetrician cleared her for return to work in the sixth month only on the understanding that she “can lift up to 30 pounds *on occasion*” and she can “*occasionally climb more than 2 flights of stairs*” (emphasis added), the employer had no need for a *second* note from King's physician to establish why she quit in the eighth month.

There is good reason for *Bublis*'s burden-shifting rule, as the facts of this case demonstrate. Not only did King's employer never contend that it lacked information necessary to decide whether to offer an accommodation or pay unemployment benefits, but it is not clear that King ever understood the employer's leave policies clearly enough to request some or all of the discretionary 12 weeks of additional leave available under the company's policies. Indeed, King, who testified at the hearing on her claim for unemployment compensation through a sign-language interpreter, told the claims examiner that she had repeatedly requested an interpreter to explain the company's policies because she could not understand them. Unless the full court addresses this case *en banc*, the employer stands to receive a *931 windfall for its decision to terminate King without considering whether she should be granted some or all of the additional 12 weeks of discretionary medical leave available under company policy. Surely these circumstances are sufficient to place the burden on “the party assumed to have greater knowledge of the regulatory scheme” to confirm “the nature and cause of the illness and the prospect it holds out for resumption of work,” *Bublis*, 575 A.2d at 304. **FN2** Because litigants and administrators alike need guidance from this court on this critical question, I would grant the petition for rehearing *en banc*.

FN2. The panel majority tries to distinguish *Bublis* by writing that here, “King's doctor had cleared her to return to work after initially asking that she be excused from work because of complications related to her pregnancy.” 966 A.2d at 870.

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In contrast, the panel writes, Bubliss's doctor "never cleared her to return to work." *Id.* It bears repeating, however, that King's doctor only cleared her to return to work with restrictions-lifting "up to 30 pounds *on occasion*" and "*occasionally climb[ing] more than 2 flights of stairs.*" Even that limited clearance came only after King's employer had deferred her return to work pending receipt of a letter from King's doctor clarifying the accommodations required by her pregnancy. These medical restrictions scarcely could have caused King's employer to believe that all issues arising out of King's pregnancy had ended when she returned to work in the sixth month.

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District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
CHIMES DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, INC., Petitioner,
v.
Patricia O. KING, Respondent.
No. 06-AA-1003.

Argued Nov. 19, 2008.
Decided March 5, 2009.

Background: Employer appealed from decision of the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings awarding unemployment benefits to claimant.

Holding: The Court of Appeals, [Washington](#), C.J., held that claimant failed to establish that her cause for leaving was connected with her work as she did not provide employer with sufficient notice that her pregnancy was aggravated by her work, and thus, claimant did not qualify for unemployment benefits.

Reversed.

[King](#), Senior Judge, filed dissenting opinion.

West Headnotes

[1] Unemployment Compensation 392T 486

392T Unemployment Compensation
392TIX Judicial Review
392Tk469 Scope of Review
392Tk486 k. Substantial Evidence; Competent Evidence. [Most Cited Cases](#)
Appellate court will set aside an unemployment compensation decision if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, i.e., there must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence so a reasonable mind might accept that evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.

[2] Unemployment Compensation 392T 112

392T Unemployment Compensation
392TIV Cause of Unemployment
392TIV(C) Voluntary Abandonment of Employment
392Tk112 k. Pregnancy. [Most Cited Cases](#)

Claimant failed to establish that her cause for leaving was connected with her work as she did not provide employer with sufficient notice that her pregnancy was aggravated by her work, and thus, claimant did not qualify for unemployment benefits; since her doctor had cleared her to work, claimant had to provide a new statement from her doctor to establish that her reasons for leaving were connected with her work, as required by statute, and at time claimant decided to quit working, she did not provide employer with any updated medical documentation indicating that her pregnancy was being aggravated by her continuing to adhere to modified work arrangements that employer had put in place for claimant. [D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 51-110\(a\)](#); [D.C. Mun.Reg. tit. 7, § 311.7](#).

[3] Unemployment Compensation 392T 111

392T Unemployment Compensation
392TIV Cause of Unemployment
392TIV(C) Voluntary Abandonment of Employment
392Tk111 k. Illness or Physical Disability of Employee. [Most Cited Cases](#)
“Good cause” for leaving employment is satisfied where the former employee leaves the employer because of an illness or disability caused or aggravated by the work, but before a former employee may qualify for unemployment compensation benefits, she must show that she supplied the employer with a “medical statement” documenting the disability or illness before she resigned so that the employer can verify the condition and make an accommodation, if necessary. [D.C. Mun.Reg. tit. 7, § 311.7](#).

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[4] Unemployment Compensation 392T 111

392T Unemployment Compensation
392TIV Cause of Unemployment
392TIV(C) Voluntary Abandonment of Employment

392Tk111 k. Illness or Physical Disability of Employee. [Most Cited Cases](#)

In order to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits, claimant had to present substantial evidence that (i) she left employer voluntarily, (ii) because of an illness or disability, (iii) that was caused or aggravated by her work. [D.C. Mun.Reg. tit. 7, § 311.4](#).

[5] Unemployment Compensation 392T 111

392T Unemployment Compensation
392TIV Cause of Unemployment
392TIV(C) Voluntary Abandonment of Employment

392Tk111 k. Illness or Physical Disability of Employee. [Most Cited Cases](#)

The requirement that an employee submit to the employer a medical statement or equivalent documentation is mandated by statute, allowing employee to retain eligibility for unemployment benefits if he voluntarily resigns for health reasons, but the requirement is construed liberally, as various forms of documentation are acceptable; however, despite its liberal construction, the requirement's reigning principle is that some form of documentation must be provided to the employer that substantiates the employee's claim that he or she has a medical condition or disability that is being aggravated by his or her continuing to work. [D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 51-110\(a\)](#); [D.C. Mun.Reg. tit. 7, §§ 311.4, 311.7](#).

*866 [Timothy Monahan](#), with whom [Howard K. Kurman](#) and [Laura L. Rubenstein](#), Owings Mills, MD, were on the brief, for petitioner.

[Son B. Nguyen](#), Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC, with whom [Barbara McDowell](#), Legal Aid Society, at the time the brief was filed, and [Michael N. Sohn](#), Arnold & Porter, were on the brief, for the re-

spondent.

Before [WASHINGTON](#), Chief Judge, [FISHER](#), Associate Judge, and [KING](#), Senior Judge.

[WASHINGTON](#), Chief Judge:

Appellant Chimes District of Columbia, Inc. (“Chimes”) appeals the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings’ award of unemployment benefits to Chimes’s former employee, Patricia O. King. We reverse.

I.

BACKGROUND

Chimes, a not-for-profit corporation that employs the disabled, hired King in June 2002, as a custodian pursuant to a federal contract in the District of Columbia. King worked for Chimes until January 20, 2006.

In May 2005, King became pregnant. In July 2005, during her eighth week of pregnancy, she submitted a written request for a one-month leave of absence starting on July 25, 2005, and ending on August 26, 2005. Karen Holcomb, Chimes’s Benefit Coordinator, determined that King was eligible for sixteen weeks of leave under the D.C. Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Holcomb notified King of the FMLA and informed King that she may qualify for the sixteen weeks of leave if she submitted the proper paperwork from her medical provider. Holcomb also mailed King a copy of Chimes’s policy under the FMLA. Despite King’s request for only one month of leave, she used all sixteen weeks (4 months), thereby exhausting her FMLA leave.

While on leave, King submitted letters from her doctor, Susanne Bathgate, M.D., attesting to the high-risk nature of her pregnancy and discussing the duties King could handle in her condition. The

first letter, dated October 11, 2005, stated: “I *867 certify that on October 11, 2005, Patricia King is able to resume performing the functions of [] her position [] without reasonable accommodation—please give light duty.” Holcomb responded to Dr. Bathgate with a letter on October 17, seeking clarification on the doctor's definition of “light duty” and asking whether restrictions should be imposed on King's work. In response, Dr. Bathgate's office faxed a Patient Work Profile dated October 16, 2005, noting that “Ms. King may return to work now.” But on October 19, Dr. Bathgate sent a type-written letter to Holcomb, which read:

Patricia King is under my obstetrical care. Some modifications of her duties should be made to improve her obstetrical outcome. Please limit her duties to lifting no more than 10 pounds. She should also refrain from climbing more than two flights of stairs, pulling and pushing any heavy objects.

On October 21, Holcomb mailed a letter to King explaining that Chimes had received King's doctor's restrictions and it determined that, given the nature of King's work as a custodian, King could not return to work to perform her duties until the restrictions were lifted. Holcomb further explained in the letter that King could continue to use her FMLA leave until November 14, and she should await her doctor's release.

On November 8, 2005, King sent Chimes a second Return to Work Medical Certification, which stated that King could return to work and lift up to 30 pounds and climb more than 2 flights of stairs, on occasion. It further stated that “[King would] be unable to work entirely for 6-8 weeks following delivery.”

King did not return to work on November 8, 2005. Holcomb sent her a letter acknowledging that she had exhausted her FMLA leave and Chimes could no longer hold the position open for her. King then contacted Holcomb stating that she wanted to return to work and would seek clarification from her doc-

tor on her restrictions. Holcomb told King that she would need documentation that King could work full duty or confirmation that King's restrictions were lifted.

Chimes faxed a job description to Dr. Bathgate for approval of King's duties, and the doctor responded by approving King's return to work. Dr. Bathgate determined that King was approved to perform her duties from “11/17/05 until the birth of her child.” Additionally, King, Holcomb, Chimes's on-site Project Manager, and its Contract Administrator signed and dated a statement which acknowledged that King chose “to continue working before her leave period for birth of her child.” King reported to work on November 23, and worked without incident for nearly two months.

King testified that around January 20, 2006, she was experiencing pressure on her lower back and feeling dizzy. She told her direct supervisor, Sarah Price, Chimes's Project Manager at the Department of Interior, that she “wanted to stop work on January 20th” and she asked if her job could be held open for her. According to King, Price said it wouldn't be a problem.

King never provided Chimes with any additional medical documentation for this second leave and King testified that her doctor had no concerns with her ability to work before the birth. She did not contact the Human Resources department or get approval for leave before she stopped working. On January 23, 2006, Chimes mailed a letter to King rejecting her request for time-off and explained that she had exhausted her FMLA leave time. Chimes informed King that she was ineligible for additional leave and it could no *868 longer hold her position open for her. King was terminated effective January 20.

In February, King sent a letter to Chimes from Dr. Bathgate dated February 7, 2006. In her letter, Dr. Bathgate wrote:

Patricia King is under my care for pregnancy.

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Her estimated due date is March 13th, 2006. Ms. King has experienced complications this pregnancy and has been unable to work for portions of the pregnancy. After delivery, I anticipate that she will need a minimum of 4 weeks and probably 6-8 weeks recovery. Thank you for helping Ms. King.

The letter did not suggest that King's pregnancy required her to stop working on January 20, 2006.

The District of Columbia Department of Employment Services determined that King was "laid off for lack of work"; and thus, she was eligible for unemployment benefits. On July 26, 2006, Administrative Law Judge Steven M. Wellner ("ALJ") held a hearing on the matter. Holcomb and Price testified at the hearing on Chimes's behalf, and King testified on her own behalf. Judge Wellner affirmed the Department of Employment Services's decision that King was eligible for benefits, but the ALJ determined King was eligible on the basis that she left work voluntarily for good cause (as opposed to the examiner's finding that King left for lack of work).

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] We will set aside an unemployment compensation decision if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record-*i.e.*, there must be "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence so a reasonable mind might accept that evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. *Hockaday v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs.*, 443 A.2d 8, 12 (D.C.1982); accord, D.C.Code § 2-1510 (a)(3)(e); see *Bublis v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs.*, 575 A.2d 301, 303 (D.C.1990).

III.

ANALYSIS

[2] The issue here is whether King provided Chimes with sufficient medical information to support the ALJ's decision that she voluntarily quit her job for good cause related to her employment and thus, was qualified to receive unemployment benefits.

[3] An individual who leaves her job voluntarily may claim unemployment benefits if she resigned with good cause connected with the work. D.C.Code § 51-110(a) (2006); see 7 DCMR §§ 311.3, 311.4, 311.7(e) (2006); see also *Bublis, supra*, 575 A.2d at 303. Good cause is satisfied where the former employee leaves the employer because of an "illness or disability caused or aggravated by the work." *Bublis, supra*, 575 A.2d at 303; see 7 DCMR § 311.7. However, before a former employee may qualify for benefits under this provision, she must show that she supplied the employer with a "medical statement" documenting the disability or illness before she resigned "so that the employer can verify the condition and make an accommodation, if necessary." *Branson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs.*, 801 A.2d 975, 978 (D.C.2002); accord 7 DCMR § 311.7; *Bublis, supra*, 575 A.2d at 303 (employer should receive an opportunity to ameliorate the work conditions or provide remedies).

[4] Specifically, in order to qualify for benefits in this case, King had to present substantial evidence that (i) she left Chimes voluntarily, (ii) because of an illness or disability, (iii) that was caused or *869 aggravated by her work. See 7 DCMR § 311.4 (former employee who left work voluntarily has the burden), § 311.7(e). Here, there is no dispute that King left Chimes voluntarily. She told Chimes that her last day would be January 20, 2006, and she did not appear for work thereafter. It is also undisputed that King quit her job because of her pregnancy, and although pregnancy is not a work-related illness, see *Brooks v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs.*, 453 A.2d 812, 813 (D.C.1982),

“[a] voluntary quit because of pregnancy shall be treated like any other voluntary quit because of physical condition or disability.” See 7 DCMR § 311.11. With regard to the third prong, however, King has failed to establish that her cause for leaving was connected with her work as she did not provide Chimes with sufficient notice that on or about January 20, 2006, her pregnancy was aggravated by her work.

[5] The requirement that an employee submit to the employer a medical statement or equivalent documentation is mandated by statute but construed liberally, as various forms of documentation are acceptable. *Bublis, supra*, 575 A.2d at 303. Despite its liberal construction, however, the requirement's reigning principle is that some form of documentation must be provided to the employer that substantiates the employee's claim that he or she has a medical condition or disability that is being aggravated by his or her continuing to work.

In *Bublis*, we held that an employer had sufficient notice of a former employee's illness and the illness's likely effect on her employment despite not having received a detailed medical statement from the former employee. *Id.* *Bublis* took leave from her job because of a major depressive disorder. *Id.* *Bublis*'s physician sent the employer a note stating that she could not work for six weeks, but it omitted details regarding her illness. *Id.* Although the company did not know the specifics of *Bublis*'s condition, it was aware of its general nature and her hospitalization, and it did not need to seek further documentation from *Bublis*. *Id.* Based on the facts of that case, we held that *Bublis* had provided sufficient information to her employer to satisfy her burden of providing medical justification for her unavailability and that was enough to shift the burden to the employer to seek further information from *Bublis* to determine whether to further accommodate her or to accept the possibility that she would resign and claim benefits. *Id.* at 304-05.

Chimes was aware early on that King was experiencing a complicated pregnancy. In fact, King was

initially excused from work based on information that Chimes received from her physician. Subsequently, Chimes honored the request of King's physician to modify her job responsibilities in order to accommodate her physical condition. However, at the time King decided to quit working, she did not provide Chimes with any updated medical documentation indicating that her pregnancy was being aggravated by her continuing to adhere to the modified work arrangements that Chimes had put in place for King. Therefore, there is no support in the record for the ALJ's conclusion that King left for good cause connected to her work.

King told Ms. Price that her last day would be January 20, 2006, and that she did not want to work anymore because of her pregnancy. It was anticipated that she would give birth in mid-March. As we noted above, King had pregnancy complications in the fall of 2005, which Chimes acknowledged had made her unable to work. However, while Chimes was on notice of King's previous complications that had prevented her from continuing work in *870 the fall, King's doctor had subsequently notified Chimes that King could work under modified conditions and Chimes had made accommodations accordingly. King failed to provide Chimes with any updated medical statement in January stating that her pregnancy was being aggravated by her modified workload or that the work was causing any harm to her pregnancy. And, we have already made it clear that pregnancy alone is not a work-related illness. See *Brooks, supra*, 453 A.2d at 813 (pregnant security officer denied benefits after failing to show medical documentation that her work gave her cause for leaving).

While our dissenting colleague finds King's prior notice sufficient under *Bublis* because Chimes “possessed enough information to ‘require it to assume the duty of inquiring further of her’ about her health,” the facts in the instant case undermine his reliance on that doctrine. See *Bublis, supra*, 575 A.2d at 305. Here, unlike in *Bublis*, King's doctor had cleared her to return to work after initially ask-

ing that she be excused from work because of complications related to her pregnancy. Thus, her situation is unlike *Bublis* whose doctor never cleared her to return to work. It was precisely because there was no reason for the employer to believe that *Bublis's* status had changed with respect to her ability to work that we placed the burden on her employer to request clarification of, or further information regarding, the “medical statement” that had been provided by the doctor if the employer needed that information in order to decide whether to offer an accommodation to the employee or pay unemployment benefits. See *Branson*, 801 A.2d at 978 (to meet the “illness or disability” prong, the employee must provide the employer with a “medical statement” before resigning “so that the employer can verify the condition and make an accommodation if necessary”). Here, King could not rely on her past doctor's note to meet the “medical statement” requirement of the Unemployment Compensation Act, D.C.Code § 51-101 et seq., since her doctor had cleared her to work. Hence, she had to provide a new statement from her doctor to establish that her reasons for leaving were connected with her work as required by the regulations.^{FN1} See 7 DCMR § 311.7. King never provided Chimes with such a statement or the opportunity to accommodate her.^{FN2} Therefore, King does not qualify for unemployment benefits based on the theory that she left work voluntarily for good cause connected with the work.

FN1. Even assuming King orally notified her supervisor that her work was causing her pregnancy complications or aggravating her condition, such oral notification would not suffice to meet the medical statement requirement as it was not “a physician's statement or equivalent documentation.” See *Branson, supra*, 801 A.2d at 979 n. 2 (a claimant's oral notification would not suffice as a medical statement).

FN2. The letter King's physician sent to Chimes after King had left work on Janu-

ary 20, 2006, and had received her separation letter, was not sufficient to establish King's burden. See *Couser v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs.*, 744 A.2d 990, 991 (D.C.1999) (denying benefits where employee resigned at physician's advice without notifying employer as to the reason and later sent notice to employer of doctor's recommendations).

IV.

CONCLUSION

Because King did not sufficiently supply Chimes with a medical statement as required by 7 DCMR § 311.7(e), she is not entitled to unemployment benefits. Therefore, the judgment granting Patricia O. King unemployment benefits is reversed.

So ordered.

KING, Senior Judge, dissenting:

Unemployment compensation benefits are a statutory right for those genuinely eligible under D.C.Code § 51-110(a) (2006), and the statute is to be construed broadly to accomplish the legislative and statutory intent of minimizing the economic burden of unemployment. See *Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Labor*, 409 A.2d 164, 170-71 (D.C.1979). Employees presenting sufficient evidence that they left their employment voluntarily, for good cause, and for reasons connected with their work are entitled to benefits. See 7 DCMR § 311.4. In my view, appellee Patricia O. King presented sufficient evidence to meet that requirement.

Chimes was certainly aware that King was having medical problems relating to work due to her pregnancy, evidenced by her prior memorandum on work restrictions and her communication to her employer that she would require an additional leave of absence until her child was born. As in *Bublis v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs.*,

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575 A.2d 301 (D.C.1990), we should hold that the employer possessed enough information to “require it to assume the duty of inquiring further of her” about her health, because “basic fairness dictates that *at some point* the party assumed to have greater knowledge of the regulatory scheme must bear the responsibility of confirming the nature and cause of the illness and the prospect it holds out for resumption of work” (emphasis in the original). Therefore, I conclude that King presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that she left work for good cause and that she previously supplied her employer with a medical statement regarding her disability, as required by 7 DCMR §§ 311.4 and 311.7(e). Because I would affirm the judgment of the Office of Administrative Hearing’s administrative law judge, I respectfully dissent.

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